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iSlAMiCAllY inFoRMED  
SoViEt PAtRiotiSM  
in PoStWAR kYRGYZStAn
though far removed from the front lines of World War ii, Central Asia’s religious 
life experienced a period of tremendous dynamism in the war’s immediate 
aftermath. The postwar changes in Islam testify to the emergence of a new ield 
of possibilities for harmonizing Soviet and Islamic afiliation among a signiicant 
portion of the population. Many Central Asian Muslims found that dedication to 
islam and patriotism for the uSSR reinforced one another. World War ii generated 
an inclusive environment, based on notions of justice and collective sacriice 
that found resonance in islamic tradition. this environment gave birth to an 
impulse among Central Asian Muslims to belong to the Soviet union, compelling 
them to seek a platform of common values that they could share with the state. 
this platform allowed many Central Asians to view themselves as good Soviet 
citizens because they were good Muslims. 
this paper examines attempts by Muslims in Soviet kyrgyzstan in the second 
half of the 1940s to belong to two communities, Soviet and islamic. it argues that 
World War ii created an opening in the region for Muslims to make sense of their 
place in Soviet society on islamic terms by articulating an islamically informed 
Soviet patriotism. through an analysis of two conceptual spaces, which i term the 
views “from above” and “from below,” it demonstrates that the war released an 
impulse towards coexistence between state and society in Central Asia. The irst 
space, “from above,” refers to the quest for legitimacy of a muftiate, or Islamic 
organization, established in 1943. this Central Asian muftiate, known by the 
Russian acronym SADuM, forcefully argued that islam had a productive role to 
play in Soviet society. it deployed this argument to convince Muslim communities 
across the region to submit to its administrative authority throughout the 1940s. 
The second space, “from below,” refers to the lurry of voluntary, patriotic labor 
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and charity organized by mosques in the second half of the 1940s. Taken together, 
these efforts to harmonize Soviet and Islamic afiliation into a unitary whole relect 
a dynamic, if uncertain, effort to move beyond the anti-religious violence of the 
dekulakization and collectivization drives as well as the Cultural Revolution and 
Great terror. 
This attempt by Muslims to bring together two seemingly incompatible afiliations, 
Soviet and islamic, emerged from the convergence of two historical trends present in 
Central Asia during and after World War II: the relaxation of oficial pressure upon 
religion, and the spirit of collective sacriice permeating Soviet society as a result 
of the cataclysm. Stalin’s religious reforms created a legal framework for religion 
to exist in the form of institutions such as the Russian orthodox Church.1 no one 
in the Party-state knew how to implement these reforms on the ground, least of all 
with respect to islam; therefore, regulation of religious affairs was in a state of total 
chaos in Central Asia during the war and in its aftermath.2 in a wartime and postwar 
climate that lacked concerted public castigation or local supervision of religion, room 
emerged for people, Muslim or otherwise, to attach sacred meaning to the war.3 
Beyond the immediate wartime context and its aftermath, this coexistence of 
Soviet patriotism and islamic belonging undoubtedly owed a debt of gratitude to 
precedents established in the early years of Bolshevik rule in Central Asia. the 
period from 1921-1926 in particular witnessed an accommodationist, conciliatory 
policy towards islam that facilitated the formation of partnerships between 
high-proile ‘ulama, local Bolshevik organs, and secular Muslim intellectuals.4 
1. on the reforms, see t.A. Chumachenko, Church and State in Soviet Russia: Russian 
orthodoxy from World War ii to the khrushchev Years (Armonk, n.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 
2002); Yaacov Ro’i, islam in the Soviet union: from the Second World War to Gorbachev 
(new York: Columbia university Press, 2000). 
2. i have elsewhere argued that Soviet policies toward islam reached unprecedented heights of 
moderation (unprecedented for the postwar period, at least) increasingly from the late 1940s 
onwards through the onset of khrushchev’s anti-religious campaign in late 1958/early 1959. 
this moderation amounted to all but benign neglect in certain policy areas, notably treatment 
of unregistered religious figures, and rested upon the influence of the moderate line towards 
religion within the Party-state in the years preceding khrushchev’s rise to supremacy. See 
Eren Murat tasar. “Soviet Policies toward islam: Domestic and international Considerations” 
in Phillip Muehlenbeck, ed., Religion and the Cold War: a Global Perspective (nashville: 
Vanderbilt university Press, 2012), 158-181. 
3. throughout the 1940s and early 1950s state funding and support for anti-religious 
propaganda in Central Asia reached lower levels than at any point perhaps since the earliest 
years of Soviet power. the archives of the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the kyrgyz 
Party’s Central Committee contain references to outdated propaganda posters (by as much 
as a decade, in some cases) at libraries and red chaykhanas throughout kyrgyzstan, and also 
suggest that propaganda lecture cycles conducted by the department for Party members tended 
not to include talks on anti-religious themes. to illustrate the point, one of the department’s inspectors observed in a 1948 visit to Tian Shan Province that “a mosque is located across the street from the [Jumgal] district Party committee headquarters, along with the buildings of 
the district financial office and the home of Comrade Babaev, head of the district Department of Propaganda and Agitation. From a sanitary perspective, the mosque looks better than 
Comrade Babaev’s home.” kRSDBMA 56/1/374/187 (1949). 
4. the dramatic, and perhaps hitherto unappreciated dimensions of this cooperation are 
illustrated in Ashirbek Muminov, uygun Gafurov, and Rinat Shigabdinov. “islamic Education in 
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in Central Asia, this phenomenon is often associated with the jadids, who, 
according to Adeeb khalid, successfully “transformed themselves into Muslim 
Communists and asserted the claim, again, to speak in the name of the Muslims of 
turkestan.”5 Yet attempts to weave together revolutionary and islamic reformist 
ideas were hardly conined to the Jadids.6 intellectual precedent existed for 
attempts to harmonize the Bolsheviks’ political objectives with islamic values as 
promulgated by certain ‘ulama.
the islamically informed Soviet patriotism that emerged during the postwar 
years differed from this earlier pattern of cooperation in both content and scope. 
it embraced a much larger component of the Central Asian population, which, by this 
point, had experienced three decades of Soviet rule as well as social and economic 
mobilization in the cause of the war. More signiicantly, it went beyond identifying 
potential convergences between islam and Communism. Rather, it emphasized that 
being a good Muslim was a prerequisite for being a good Soviet citizen. 
kyrgyzstan during and after the war
Soviet kyrgyzstan will strike some readers as an unconventional and perhaps 
unusual place to study the encounter between the Soviet state and Muslim 
communities. the most famous centers of islamic learning in Central Asia, Bukhara 
and Samarqand, were far removed from its borders, while Tsarist, Soviet, and some 
modern-day scholars have associated its historically nomadic population with 
“supericial” Islam (based on positivistic assumptions about the measurability of 
religious devotion on an ethnic basis).7 At irst glance, Kyrgyzstan seems marginal 
to the history of islam in Central Asia. 
Soviet and post-Soviet uzbekistan” in Michael kemper, Raoul Motika, and Stefan Reichmuth, 
eds., islamic Education in the Soviet union and its Successor States (london: Routledge, 
2010), 224-238. Pro-Bolshevik sentiment was even more pronounced in Dagestan, where, 
according to a recent study, “the majority of ‘ulama and mudarrises sided with the Bolsheviks” during the Civil War, while “shari’a courts, maktabs, madrasas, halqas and wirds continued to 
exist de facto within the Soviet state institutions, and some were even incorporated de jure.” 
See Vladimir Bobrovnikov, Amir navruzov, and Shamil Shikhaliev, “islamic Education in 
Soviet and post-Soviet Daghestan” in the same volume, 112-114.
5. Adeeb khalid, the Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: jadidism in Central Asia (Berkeley: 
university of California Press, 1998), 288.
6. Paolo Sartori, “towards a History of the Muslims’ Soviet union: a view from Central Asia”, 
Die Welt des islams 50 (2010): 320; Paolo Sartori. “What went wrong? the failure of Soviet 
policy on shari’a courts in turkestan, 1917-1923,” ibid., 411-412.
7. For arguments against this approach in reference to the kyrgyz specifically, see Devin 
DeWeese, islamization and native Religion in the Golden Horde: Baba tükles and Conversion 
to islam in Historical and Epic tradition (university Park, PA: Penn State university Press, 
1994), 65; till Mostowlansky, islam und kirgisen on tour: die Rezeption “nomadischer 
Religion” und ihr Wirkung (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2007), 30-62, 78-83. 
For modern-day implications of the discourse of “nominal” kyrgyz islam, see Baris isçi, “Proper” 
Muslim against “authentic” kyrgyz: the formation of islamic field and secular challenges in 
Bishkek, kyrgyzstan (Ph.D. Dissertation, 2010, Washington university in St. louis).
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Yet, for two compelling reasons, the republic offers an ideal case study of the 
complex responses exhibited by Muslims to the wartime climate and its aftermath. 
First, the heavily populated agricultural swathes of the Farghona Valley fell partly 
within its borders, and indeed constitute the geographic focus of much of this paper. 
these areas belonged to the broader cultural and religious sphere of the valley and did 
not signiicantly differ in religious practice, linguistic preference, or ethnic makeup 
from neighboring districts in uzbekistan and tajikistan.8 it is therefore misleading 
and erroneous to speak of the republic as completely distinct, or isolated, from more 
“islamic” parts of the Central Asian region. Second, the borders assigned by Soviet 
planners to kyrgyzstan in 1924 and 1936 brought together historically nomadic 
and sedentary zones under one roof.9 the kyrgyz documentation therefore offers 
the historian an opportunity to capture the full diversity of Muslim responses to 
Soviet modernization, from agricultural collective farms that differed little from 
their counterparts in uzbekistan and tajikistan, to the collectivized ranches of the 
high tian Shan. 
kyrgyzstan also does not often emerge in discussions of the effect of World 
War ii upon Soviet Muslims.10 Yet the conlict’s impact on the republic was 
profound.11 Between the nazi invasion and September 1944, 363,144 residents of 
kyrgyzstan, or one in four of the republic’s inhabitants, were drafted into the Red 
Army.12 Soviet propaganda hailed the participation of Central Asia’s indigenous 
nationalities13 in the war’s front lines as a symbol of interethnic Soviet patriotism and 
Socialist solidarity.14 For decades after the war, kyrgyz audiences were reminded 
8. As of the 1959 census, kyrgyzstan’s population included 836,831 kyrgyz (40.5%), 623,562 
Russians (30.2%, mostly in the northern part of the republic) and 218,640 uzbeks (10.6%, most 
of them in the south). itogi vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1959 g. (M., 1962), 206-208.
9. on the implications of the 1924 national delimitation and 1936 Stalin constitution for the 
borders of kyrgyzstan, see usenaly Chotonov, Ata meken tarykhy: XX kylym (Bishkek, 
2001), 30-31. 
10. the wartime fate of two Soviet Muslim groups affected much more directly by the nazi 
invasion, the Crimean tatars and the Chechens, has been examined in several scholarly 
studies, including, most recently: Gul´nara Bekirova, krymskotatarskaia problema v SSSR, 
1944-1991 (Simferopol´, 2004); Movsur M. ibragimov, Chechenskaia Respublika v period 
Velikoi otechestvennoi Voiny (nal´chik, 2007); Greta lynn uehling, Beyond memory: the 
Crimean tatars’ deportation and return (new York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).
11. For a recent discussion of the war’s impact on tashkent, the capital of neighboring 
uzbekistan, see Paul Stronski, tashkent: Forging a Soviet City, 1930-1966 (Pittsburgh, PA: 
university of Pittsburgh Press, 2010), 119-172.
12. of these, 42.2% hailed from Frunze province (today’s Bishkek), 21.6% from osh, 15.8% 
from jalalabat, 12.8% from Ysyk köl, and 7.6% from tian Shan (today’s naryn). the figure 
includes 1,395 women. S.k. kerimbaev, Sovetskii kirgizstan v Velikoi otechestvennoi Voine 
1941-1945 gg. (Frunze, 1980), 215-216. 
13. it seems probable that kyrgyz outnumbered Russians given that the former tended to have 
larger families. By way of example, kyrgyz soldiers comprised 86.2% of the ranks of the 107th 
Cavalry Division (founded in kyrgyzstan) though they occupied only 26.9% of its leadership 
positions. (Russians filled 44.1% of those positions). ibid., 217.
14. indeed, the policy of promoting “national” units (especially cavalry brigades) within the 
Red Army had a clear legitimizing purpose vis-à-vis Soviet Muslims. in a 1943 session with 
military agitators, for example, Mikhail kalinin alluded to the 1916 anti-tsarist rebellion 
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that the 385th Artillery Division, which was established in kyrgyzstan, participated 
in the attack on Berlin on April 16, 1945.15 the cultural and social experience of total 
mobilization naturally extended well beyond the ranks of soldiers drafted into the 
army.16 Virtually the entire republican population from the ages of 16 to 60 enrolled 
in anti-aircraft and chemical defense training courses, for example.17 Wartime 
Kyrgyzstan also featured a lurry of literary, musical, and artistic production in the 
cause of the war, some of it the result of collaboration between kyrgyz intellectuals 
and evacuees from the Western uSSR.18 these and other examples illustrate the 
ways in which the war impacted families and individuals in Central Asia despite its 
distance from the front. 
on these grounds, one may legitimately position kyrgyzstan at the center of any 
analysis of the war’s impact on Muslims and islam in Central Asia. World War ii 
changed the lives of the republic’s residents so profoundly precisely because many 
of them were Soviet citizens and believing Muslims.
Source and methodological problems
this paper relies on two bodies of documentation: archival records of the state 
body charged with supervising religious affairs – the Council for the Affairs of 
Religious Cults (CARC) – and correspondence of the Central Asian muftiate 
(SADuM). As with any Soviet source concerning religion, these documents present 
signiicant methodological challenges and limitations. Soviet society restricted the 
set of institutions that could produce written output concerning religion. the vast 
majority of source material on Islam consequently claims oficial provenance.19 
(whose epicenter was kyrgyzstan) by contrasting Soviet conscription policies with those of 
the Russian Empire: “in the tsarist system, Azerbaijanis and the peoples of Central Asia – 
turkmen, uzbeks, kazakhs, kyrgyz, and others, did not fight and were not admitted into the 
army. the tsarist state did not trust them or involve them into military affairs…[But] now all 
peoples have the same rights. And all the peoples of the Soviet union, even those that were once 
considered backward, now participate in warfare.” kerimbaev, Sovetskii kirgizstan, 214. 
15. Bakai Sultanaliev, kirgizstantsy v Velikoi otechestvennoi Voine (Frunze, 1977), 24.
16. Perhaps an unparalleled visual panorama of wartime kyrgyzstan is offered in the film 
Dzhamiliia (irina Poplavskaia, 1969), based on Chingiz Aitmatov’s (1928-2008) 1959 novelette 
of the same name and narrated, in part, by the author. 
17. Asel´ t. toktomatov, Deiatel´nost´ Sovetov kirgizii v gody Velikoi otechestvennoi Voiny 
1941-1945 gg. (Frunze, 1986), 29. 
18. For example, november 1942 saw the staging of an opera based on traditional kyrgyz 
music, kokul, by Mikhail M. Raukhverger (1901-1989). the libretto was co-written by 
o. Sarbagyshev and V. Vinnikov. kerimbaev, Sovetskii kirgizstan, 166. 
19. this does not mean that traditional methods and genres of islamic textual production came to 
a halt. Sources of this variety written during the Soviet period are currently being uncovered by 
Central Asian scholars and, when available, will serve as an important new body of material for 
the study of islam in twentieth century Central Asia. For an anthropological analysis of female 
islamic figures in Central Asia that makes some use of some hand-written family histories, see 
Habiba Fathi, Femmes d’Asie centrale contemporaine: quête des ancêtres et recompositions identitaires dans l’islam postsoviétique (P.: Maisonneuve & larose, 2004).
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For reasons discussed in this article, SADuM’s staff, in particular, had every reason 
to praise Soviet policies towards religion, and to eschew mentioning past intervals 
of anti-religious violence.20
Source limitations and bias constitute the bane of all historians. this reality 
should not, however, discourage scholars from studying the social history of Muslim 
communities in Soviet Central Asia. When scrutinized wiith an appropriate degree 
of imagination and analytical acumen, Soviet documentation concerning islam 
offers unparalleled insight into the everyday realities of the encounter between the 
Soviet state, Islamic institutions such as mosques (within and beyond SADUM), 
and Muslim communities. one must employ these sources, however, with two 
caveats in mind. 
First, CARC and SADUM did not devote equal attention in their correspondence 
to all Central Asian Muslims. the Soviet state employed the nebulous category 
of “believing Muslims” (veruiushchie-musul´mane) while the muftiate simply 
referred to “the Muslims” (musulmonlar, mo’min-musulmonlar, or sometimes 
oddiy musulmonlar). in fact, the individuals who came to the attention of these 
two entities were largely those who practiced religion in one form or another, 
most especially those who frequented mosques on Fridays and/or the two ‘eids. 
During the 1940s this amounted to a considerable component of the still largely 
rural population.21 non-observant Muslims, or for that matter atheists belonging 
to indigenous nationalities, who practiced certain traditions associated with 
islam in Central Asia (e.g., frying dough in honor of one’s ancestors) failed to 
attract the attention of either CARC or SADuM, albeit with some exceptions.22 
the islamically informed Soviet patriotism analyzed in this paper therefore largely 
concerns mosque-going believers, though there is no reason to suppose that it might 
not have resonated with a signiicant part of the larger Muslim population.
Second, questioning the sincerity of those Muslims who advanced this 
patriotism offers little beneit to the historian. Whether they did so out of irm 
personal conviction, to juggle the competing emotional demands of experiencing 
repression and subsequent total war in the space of one decade, or merely to acquire 
the conidence of local oficials, is impossible to determine. Rather than analyzing 
motive or material incentive, this paper therefore argues that the war created a new 
ield of possibilities for harmonizing Soviet and Islamic afiliation in word and deed. 
20. on the anti-religious policies of the Soviet state in uzbekistan during the Cultural 
Revolution and the Great terror, see Shoshana keller, to Moscow, not Mecca: the Soviet 
Campaign Against islam in Central Asia, 1917-1941 (Westport, Ct: Fraeger, 2001).
21. it is impossible to determine the percentage of Central Asian Muslims who practiced 
religion. Suffice it to say that the panorama of islamic observance in the 1940s would have 
been unrecognizable to an observer in, say, the 1970s. For example, an average of 500 people attended the dawn prayer at the Ravat Abdulloxon mosque in Osh on a daily basis during 
the 1940s. kRBMA 2597/1s/4/217 (1947). in district centers in the south i.e., small towns, the 
corresponding numbers for the morning prayer ranged from 18-100. kRBMA 2597/1s/7/51 
(March 30, 1948). 
22. in contrast, much debate occurred within the Party about the appropriateness of certain 
religious practices, such as circumcision, for Party members. 
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this process certainly contained an element of what Stephen kotkin has termed 
the “obligatory language for self-identiication,” which became “the barometer of 
one’s political allegiance to the cause.”23 Yet its central and deining element was 
creativity from the ground up. Muslims, rather than the Soviet state, developed 
the concept of islamically informed Soviet patriotism as a response to the war’s 
demands, Stalin’s religious reforms, and a postwar climate featuring relatively little 
pressure upon islam. this amounted to nothing less than an attempt from outside of 
the state to carve a conceptual space for islam in a society ruled by atheists. 
A view from above: SADuM
Created largely as an afterthought to Stalin’s wartime religious reforms, the Central 
Asian muftiate hungered for legitimacy within state and society during the second 
half of the 1940s.24 to this end, the mufti and his associates presented SADuM as 
the organizational manifestation of Soviet Muslimness. they sought to construct 
a platform of common values that the broader Muslim population could share 
with oficialdom, including sacriice, devotion to homeland, physical labor for the 
common good, rebuilding the country after World War ii, and justice. 
the muftiate tapped into a broader societal impulse towards coexistence, as well 
as apparent popular jubilation at the symbolic signiicance of its establishment. 
Yet SADuM also harbored less high-minded reasons to reconcile Soviet and 
Islamic sources of afiliation. Established in 1943 effectively by state decree, 
the organization had no legitimacy or presence in Central Asian communities.25 
Such an entity, moreover, lacked precedent in the region’s history.26 it therefore 
encountered some measure of suspicion from both the Party-state, which remained 
nominally committed to liquidating religion, as well as ordinary Muslims across 
Central Asia’s ive republics. The latter, in particular, saw no reason to hand 
control of the mosques in their communities, not to mention donations, over to 
a distant and alien islamic bureaucracy based in tashkent. SADuM therefore 
23. Stephen kotkin, Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization (Berkeley: university of 
California Press, 1995), 220.
24. these reforms saw the creation of four Soviet muftiates. For a discussion of the muftiates’ 
establishment, see Ro’i, islam in the Soviet union. 
25. on SADuM’s establishment, see Shamsuddinxon Boboxonov, Shayx Ziyovuddinxon ibn 
Eshon Boboxon (tashkent, 2001), 41.
26. turkestan was the one Muslim region of the Russian Empire that lacked its own muftiate. 
there is no evidence that the Russian muftiate, which continued to function throughout the 
Soviet period in ufa, claimed any authority or recognition in Central Asia, despite its repeated efforts to assert some control over mosques in the region. On the Tsarist muftiates, see Robert 
D. Crews, For Prophet and tsar: islam and Empire in Russia and Central Asia (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard university Press, 2006); Firouzeh Mostashari, on the Religious Frontier: tsarist 
Russia and islam in the Caucasus (new York: i.B. tauris, 2006); james Meyer, turkic Worlds: 
Community Representation and Collective identity in the Russian and ottoman Empires, 
1870-1914 (Ph.D Dissertation, 2007, Brown university). 
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confronted a need to justify its existence and pretensions to authority as an 
islamic body.
The question of the muftiate’s leadership compounded this problem of 
legitimacy. For reasons that remain unclear, the uzbek government recommended 
an old family of Naqshbandi Sui shaykhs, the Boboxonovs, to run SADUM. 
Both the irst mufti, Eshon Boboxon (1863-1957), and his son (and second mufti), 
Ziyovuddinxon (1908-1982), were arrested by the nkVD during the Great terror 
and later released for lack of evidence of a crime. this was also true of many other 
high-proile igures in the irst generation of SADUM’s leadership.27 Moreover, 
the available evidence suggests that the Boboxonov family’s Naqshbandi lineage 
both furthered and complicated its quest for legitimacy.28 on the one hand, the 
mufti and his associates could count on the support of an extensive network of 
disciples across Central Asia.29 But on the other, they found themselves the subject 
of attacks from different quarters: some Muslim igures targeted their ‘un-Islamic’ 
practice of proiting from donations left at the shrines of saints30, while certain 
local masters and scholars did not wish to relinquish authority to a body run by one 
particular family.31 thus, SADuM had pressing incentive to identify some moral 
foundation for its pretensions to legitimacy before suspicious circles, both oficial 
and religious.
To justify the muftiate’s role and existence, the irst mufti, Eshon Boboxon, 
identiied World War II as a meeting ground for Soviet and Islamic narratives of 
righteousness. Circular letters sent out by Eshon Boboxon to imams stressed the 
religious nature of the task of rebuilding the country after Word War ii. As the mufti 
knew, this genre of communication was likely to reach both oficial and popular 
audiences.32 During the postwar years, when Ramadhan fell during the summer 
months of the cotton harvest, SADuM emphasized that observance of the Muslim 
fast must not result in any decrease in productivity. A circular letter to the mosques 
in 1947 attached moral importance to physical labor: 
27. o’zRMDA r-2456/1/184/53 (1956). in fact, Eshon Boboxon was arrested twice, in 1937 
and 1940. Amirsaidkhan usmankhodzhaev, Zhizn´ muftiev Babakhanovykh: sluzhenie 
vozrozhdeniiu islama v Sovetskom Soiuze (nizhnyi novgorod, 2008), 36.
28. On the Boboxonovs' Naqshbandi roots, see Usmankhodzhaev, Zhizn´ muftiev 
Babakhanovykh, 26-27.
29. kRBMA 2597/1s/4/219 (1947); o’zRMDA r-2456/1/211/14 (october 10, 1957).
30. These complaints were voiced by the Islamic scholar Shafoat hoji Xoliqnazarov, who 
represented the ‘ulama of the city of osh (in southern kyrgyzstan) to SADuM during the 
1940s. He lamented that “never in history, from the days of God’s Messenger to our time, have 
organizations based on the shari’a placed shrines under their protection and extracted profits 
from them.” kRBMA 2597/1s/2/39ob-40ob (March 16, 1947).
31. For example, Shafoat hoji proposed the unification of the four Muslim boards into one 
muftiate for the whole Soviet union, “for without a unitary center one can expect no order.” 
kRBMA 2597/1s/2/33 (February 16, 1947). 
32. SADuM’s correspondence was reviewed by government officials, while appeals from the muftiate were often read out loud at mosques. 
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As you know, our country, together with the whole people, is engaged in the 
revival and development of the national economy, destroyed during the patriotic 
war against the German invaders. in the near future, believing Muslims will 
observe Ramadhan. the harvest falls during the period of the fast. therefore, you – qadis, imams, xatibs, and members of the executive organs and inancial commissions [of the mosques] – must elucidate the unacceptability of any disruption in the gathering of the harvest to the believers in your mosques. 
Alongside observance of the fast believing Muslims must take active part in 
the gathering of the harvest, in order to show that they are good Soviet people 
(dobrymi sovetskimi liud´mi) […] Relying upon the ayats and ahadith, we 
demonstrate the necessity of observance of the laws of the government and the fulillment of daily work norms […] the Supreme Lord has eased not only 
the burden of those who are sick and of those who are traveling, but also of the elderly, of breastfeeding women and of those engaged in dificult labor, of 
those for whom observance of the fast would present hardship. For example, 
train operators, ship captains, and pilots may skip the fast. the work khovat 
al-Fatavi indicates that canal builders and miners may not fast if the heat would 
threaten their lives.33
Here the mufti placed Islam squarely at the center of the USSR’s wellbeing. In this 
description, Central Asian Muslims had suffered no less from the nazi invasion 
than other Soviet citizens. Both islamic values and loyalty to a Soviet homeland 
compelled Central Asian Muslims to maximize their individual yields during the 
harvest, in order to help rebuild the country’s economy. For most people, this 
would require abstaining from fasting. 
The question naturally arises whether SADUM issued such statements at its 
own initiative or whether it received instructions from the government bureaucracy 
charged with monitoring its affairs, the Council for the Affairs of Religious Cults 
(CARC), to do so. this particular message falls into the latter category. in light of the 
fact that Ramadhan would overlap with the harvest season, CARC’s representative 
in uzbekistan recommended that 
the leadership of SADUM write to its members, the inancial control committees and imams of the registered mosques, so that they would use their sermons to 
stress that the believers not violate professional discipline in the kolkhozes and 
under no circumstances disrupt the course of agricultural work. 
A CARC bureaucrat complained that 
the statement’s unconvincing style makes it immediately clear that SADuM 
composed it not with heartfelt sincerity, but rather as if it merely wanted to get 
someone off its back (kak budto-by otviazat´sia ot kogo-to). 
33. kRBMA 2678/1s/3/32-34 (july 12, 1947).
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Furthermore, the muftiate took its time sending the message out, meaning that 
it did not arrive in many mosques until after the start of Ramadhan.34 CARC’s 
pressure on the muftiate in this instance does not invalidate the statement’s content. 
quite the contrary: it demonstrates how SADuM responded when forced to juggle 
state pressure and its own self-conceptualization as a righteous islamic entity.
SADUM’s output in different contexts relects a similar trend. Fatwas, or formal 
legal opinions issued by Islamic scholars on a speciic question, focused on issues of 
great concern to oficialdom. One of the irst, if not the irst, legal opinions issued by 
Eshon Boboxon as mufti emerged some time between September and november of 
1945, pronouncing animal sacriice on ‘Eid ul-Adha (Uzbek, qurbon bayrami; kyrgyz, 
kurman ayt) a recommended deed based on the example of the Prophet (sunnah) rather 
than a requirement (vojib).35 Early 1947 saw tashkent pronouncing the paranji and 
chachvon – long regarded by the Communist Party as the most offensive embodiment 
of islam’s oppression of women – as non-obligatory according to the Muslim faith.36 
Although SADuM clearly sought to align itself with the state’s wishes, these fatwas 
also found precedent in the Jadid critique of popular religion.
While the muftiate emphasized its devotion to the Soviet union in communications 
with government oficials, it deployed Islamic concepts when targeting the broader 
population. Eshon Boboxon argued that the consolidation of SADuM’s authority 
constituted a righteous enterprise blessed by God. therefore, Muslim communities 
must do the right thing and submit to his dogmatic and administrative authority in 
matters of the faith. to transmit this argument, he authored a communication in a 
1945 issue of SADuM’s journal lamenting the fact that Muslims paid zakat and 
itr-sadaqa i.e. charity, not to the muftiate but to individual mullas:
During the time of the Messenger of Allah, peace and blessings be upon him, and 
under Abu Bakr, may Allah be pleased with him, specially designated collectors 
gathered zakat, ushur, and itr-sadaqa, mandatory obligations for every Muslim, 
and placed them in the treasury for expenditure on the general welfare of the 
Muslims […] nowadays, mullas engaged in self-aggrandizement are the cause 
of improper use [of these funds] […] insofar as these charitable funds are spent 
not on the needs of the faith but on general interests, the affairs of the Muslims 
and their religious leaders are in a mournful state. it is widely known that in the localities these dealings continue in an unoficial capacity.37 
the mufti and his close associates viewed SADuM as an entity serving the greater 
good. Maximizing its material foundation through acquisition of cash and resources 
would enhance the capacity of the organization, allowing it to better serve the 
34. kRBMA 2597/1s/4/316 (october 21, 1947).
35. kRBMA 2597/1s/11/167 (December 21, 1949), 2597/1s/4/219 (March-April 1947).
36. kRBMA 2597/1s/5/21 (August 10, 1948), 2597/1s/7/89 (july 15, 1948). on the Soviet 
campaign against the paranji and chachvon see Douglas northrop: Veiled Empire: Gender 
and Power in Stalinist Central Asia (ithaca, 2004); Marianne kamp. the new Woman in 
uzbekistan: islam, Modernity, and unveiling under Communism (Seattle, 2006). 
37. kRBMA 2678/1s/1/76-78 (1945).
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needs of Central Asian Muslims and to advance other righteous causes. ordinary 
Muslims should therefore eschew contact with religious igures not afiliated with 
SADUM, offering the muftiate their spiritual conidence and inancial support 
instead. to justify such an historically unprecedented proposition (in Central Asia, 
at least) this message mobilizes the powerful example of the Prophet, whose words 
and actions Sunnis revere as the ultimate example all Muslims must follow, as well 
as that of the rightly guided caliphs, emulation of whom is recommended. in doing 
so, it transmits the implicit thesis that SADuM’s activities in the context of the 
Soviet union mirrored the mission of the Prophet and caliphs in their own time.
unsurprisingly, Muslim communities responded to these appeals with a 
combination of sympathy and frustration. on the one hand, they welcomed the 
existence of an oficially sanctioned religious organization, empowered to open 
mosques that enjoyed some degree of legal protection from overbearing local 
oficials. But on the other, they harbored deep suspicion of the muftiate’s centralizing 
ambitions. Communities expressed this ambivalence in terms that closely mirrored 
the organization’s appeals to Soviet and Islamic afiliation. 
SADuM’s showdown with local miners in the southern kyrgyz city of ko’k 
Yang’aq illustrates this response particularly well. Ko’k Yang’aq was and remains 
one of the mining-centered settlements that appeared during the Soviet period in 
southern kyrgyzstan. in the 1940s its multi-ethnic population consisted almost 
exclusively of miners and their families, who left for the mines outside of town 
early in the morning and did not return home until the evening. Ko’k Yang’aq 
hosted one of the irst mosques registered by CARC in the republic, with an imam 
named Mutigulla Asadullin. 
Asadullin sympathized with the formidable working conditions faced by the 
miners every day. to this end, he encouraged local miners to perform as many 
of the daily prayers as possible at home rather than coming to the mosque. These 
pronouncements resulted in a sharp decrease in the number of Muslims coming to 
congregational prayers on days other than Friday.38 this state of affairs outraged 
a local Sui master, Murod Ortiqov, who was not employed by SADUM. Ortiqov 
arranged for the chairman of the mosque’s executive committee, Daujanov, 
to compile a petition with twenty signatures requesting that SADUM remove 
Asadullin.39 in a climate of palpable tension, Daujanov even interrupted the imam 
during one of his Friday sermons, virtually an unthinkable occurrence in Central 
Asia.40 the exasperated miners rallied around Asadullin. At a spontaneously 
organized community meeting inside the mosque on July 29, 1947, the community 
ired Daujanov from his position on the executive committee viva voce. 
38. kRBMA 2597/1s/4/217 (March-April 1947).
39. According to Soviet legislation on religion, every house of worship required a functionary, 
an executive committee in charge of finances, and a committee of twenty original signatories requesting permission to open a prayer house. The chairman of the executive committee often exercised considerable influence in the workings of mosques. Clashes between these chairmen and imams occurred frequently, especially in the 1970s and 1980s. 
40. kRBMA 2597/1s/10/82 (August 5, 1949).
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SADuM resented this apparent affront to its authority. not only had the 
community ired a mosque staff member without seeking the organization’s 
approval, but it had done so with tacit approval from an imam who was responsible 
for low mosque attendance. It dispatched envoys to personally oversee Asadullin’s 
removal and the installment of a new imam. Accusations leveled at him by these 
envoys included responsibility for the low numbers of Muslims attending the mosque, 
disrespect for holy sites and saints, “nationalism,” and being “the ladies’ imam” 
(khatunlar imamy) due to his efforts to encourage women to attend congregational 
prayers. Due to rock-solid local support for Asadullin, however, SADuM failed 
to implement his removal. the muftiate’s only remaining recourse was to appeal 
to CARC for assistance. When the bureaucrats launched an inquiry, however, they 
received a petition signed by 438 residents of Ko’k Yang’aq, praising Asadullin 
and requesting that he be allowed to stay. In these circumstances, CARC decided to 
take no action and Asadullin remained in his position until at least 1959.41 
the petition deliberately weaves together Soviet and islamic themes in a conscious 
effort to present Asadullin as the embodiment of islamically informed Soviet patriotism. 
While delicately avoiding any direct criticism of SADuM, it argues that the imam’s 
presence advanced the miners’ welfare, both as Muslims and as Soviet people:
How can we Muslims, working in the mines for eight hours, come to the mosque ive times a day? We cannot just drop our work and go to the mosque, but we do not want to see it closed either. When we have time, we pray one of the ive daily prayers at the mosque, and feel joy that the state and the religious board allow it 
to function […] God-willing, we will not let go of our imam, who struggles with 
superstitions, those obstacles to the cultural advancement of the people […] our 
imam calls people to the true path, set down by the qur’an and Sunnah. 
this petition describes a community of honest, hard-working Soviet citizens desiring 
nothing more than the presence of a single mosque in their community staffed by an 
understanding, morally upright imam. By referencing the Soviet concept of culture 
(kul´turnost´), they express a politically legitimate desire to advance their welfare 
and that of their families. Having established that they are “working Muslims” (biz 
rabuchi musulmanlar), they evoke the powerful afiliations of the “true path” (sirat 
al-mustaqim), taken out of the fatiha or the irst and most frequently recited chapter 
of the qur’an. this petition witnesses a Soviet Muslim community inscribing not 
only its Muslimness but its Sovietness as well.
World War ii marked the end of concerted anti-religious violence in Soviet 
history.42 It therefore gave people who identiied as Muslim conceptual room to 
make sense of their contribution to the Soviet homeland in islamic terms. For a 
centralizing body such as SADUM, this opening presented an opportunity to acquire 
41. the text of the petition is in kRBMA 2597/1s/10/86-99 (May 13, 1949) and in Russian 
translation in l. 81-85.
42. Eren tasar, Soviet and Muslim: the institutionalization of islam in Central Asia, 
1943-1991 (Ph.D Dissertation, 2010, Harvard university).
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sorely needed legitimacy. the muftiate’s attempt to clarify its own role with respect 
to state and society, as well as popular responses to these efforts, appealed to a 
unitary set of Soviet and Islamic afiliations. Central Asian Muslims articulated an 
islamically informed Soviet patriotism to advance their own pragmatic interests 
in religious life (as in the confrontation between SADuM and the miners over 
Asadullin), and to make sense of their role in a fundamentally new postwar social 
setting. the analysis will now turn to the manifestations of this process in the 
broader social life of Muslim communities beyond SADuM. 
A view from below: “ordinary” Muslims
if this patriotism carried resonance only for individuals working at the muftiate, or 
emerged solely in conlicts between SADUM and communities, then it would bear 
no relevance for our understanding of social life more broadly. in this case, one 
could potentially embrace the retrospective characterizations of SADuM adopted 
by some Muslims in uzbekistan today. As one imam in his forties commented, 
“SADuM was a branch of the kGB […] under the Russians it became a mechanism 
for spreading atheism.”43 this reasoning would suggest that the muftiate’s appeals 
to Soviet and Muslim afiliation merely formed one component of a strategy to 
acquire power and money.
Clearly, the mufti and his associates wanted both. Yet available historical 
documentation suggests that this patriotism resonated far beyond the muftiate. 
ordinary Muslims throughout Central Asia’s cities and collective farms, whose 
patriotic actions (and sometimes words) have come down through the archival 
record, also expressed their sense of belonging to the uSSR in an islamic framework, 
most especially through mosque-based patriotic activism. 
World War ii loomed very large in the thoughts and moral vocabularies of all 
Soviet citizens in the second half of the 1940s, including Muslims. Against the 
backdrop of this cataclysm, many Central Asians discovered fertile ground for 
inscribing themselves and their communities in the broader Soviet narrative of 
sacriice. It should not be surprising that the world’s most violent conlict to date 
should have taken on a “religious” meaning for millions of people, Muslim or 
otherwise. Speciically, it would be counter-intuitive to suggest that patriotism and 
the ideological dimensions of the war took center stage in people’s understanding 
of what was going on, while religion did not. there was ample room for Soviet 
patriotism, faith in God, islamic tradition, and even animosity towards well-fed 
German capitalists to accommodate one another in a viable whole.
Muslims clearly attached islamic and Soviet meanings to World War ii. Hakim 
Akhtiamov, CARC’s representative in kyrgyzstan from 1945-1960, made a number 
of observations in this connection, undoubtedly stemming from his personal 
contacts with large numbers of Muslims. 
43. interview, tashkent, uzbekistan, july 8, 2006.
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Clearly some of the participants in the war made a pledge during the heat of battle, that they would “respect God” if He let them live. I ind no other explanation for the 
fact that one encounters former frontoviki among the believers attending prayers.
Mirzakulov, a mechanic at an MtS decorated for bravery during the war, applied 
for admission to one of SADuM’s madrasas immediately upon his return home. 
G’ulomov, a komsomol member and Stakhanovite, wrote to Stalin vowing to 
gather 88 tsentners (8,800 kg) of cotton per hectare. Afterwards, he started attending 
the mosque and “praying to God, for His ‘help’ in fulilling the promise.”44 this 
sentiment extended to the soldiers’ family members as well, many of whom had 
prayed for their loved ones’ safe return and taken regular part in congregational 
prayers to this end during the war. For them, the Soviet victory and in many cases 
the soldiers’ return amounted to nothing less than a miracle, a response from God 
to their pleas.45 imams both registered and unregistered viewed the war as an 
opportunity to harmonize religious belief with loyalty to the Soviet state. Akhtiamov 
noted that mullas attempted to perform religious rituals and services clandestinely 
from 1930-1942, but that especially in 1942-1943 they did so much more openly. 
in 1947 the Supreme Soviet of the kyrgyz SSR awarded two prominent islamic 
igures the order of “Gallant Service during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945” 
in recognition of their “patriotic activities” during the conlict.46 
World War II’s signiicance as a focus for Soviet and Islamic narratives of 
righteousness remained intact during the 1940s. in one telling instance immediately 
after Germany’s defeat, an unregistered mulla named Bokoleev attended collective 
meetings in two separate kolkhozes dedicating to discussing the signiicance of 
Victory Day. At his initiative, those present assented to including a resolution in the 
meetings’ protocols highlighting the beneicial character of religion for humanity. 
Both protocols passed reviews by the district Communist Party committee with no 
objection; only at the provincial level did Party oficials “note the inappropriateness 
of referencing religious propaganda in a resolution dedicated to Victory Day.”47 
the salience of the war as both a patriotic and religious watershed also emerges 
in the large donations made by Muslim communities to various funds supporting 
causes related to the conlict and its aftermath. Total donations to the Fund for 
Soldiers’ Families from registered mosques amounted to 683,584 rubles for 1944 
and the irst half of 1945.48 From October 1945 to April 1946, the 4-5 mosques 
in Frunze province donated 135,182 rubles and 12,610 kilograms of grain to 
44. kRBMA 2597/1s/10/9 (january 27, 1949).
45. kRBMA 2597/1s /1/84 (july 6, 1946).
46. kRBMA 2597/1s/1/171 (March 11, 1947). these were the aforementioned Shafoat hoji Xoliqnazarov as well as SADUM’s qadi in Kyrgyzstan, Olimxon to’ra Shokirxo’jayev. It is not 
what they did to earn the award.
47. kRBMA 2597/1s/1/5 (july 10, 1945). this particular incident occurred in Stalin district, 
Frunze province (today’s Chüy province, surrounding the capital, Bishkek, in the north). 
48. kRBMA 2597/1s /1/7 (july 10, 1945).
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Gosobespechenie, requesting that the latter earmark it for families of soldiers 
who died at the front.49 The two mosques in Jalalabat and Ko’k Yang’aq collected 
5,200 rubles for the same purpose.50 The mosque in the southern Kyrgyz city of 
osh transferred 18,000 rubles and 6 tsentners or 600 kilograms of traditional bread 
(uzbek, non; Russian, lepeshka) from the Muslims of osh to that fund.51 it also bears 
mentioning that although CARC did not record speciic instances of unregistered 
mosques making patriotic donations, they almost certainly did: Akhtiamov noted 
that “the political and economic life of Muslims remains identical, not depending 
on the presence or absence of a registered mosque.”52
Mosques did not limit themselves to donations in the organization of patriotic 
activities. Muslims also engaged in charitable actions geared towards facilitating 
the maximization of the volume of the harvest. Elderly Muslims and imams went 
out into the ields around Osh, collecting 150 tons of cotton, a igure certiied in 
writing by the management of the local kolkhoz.53 in jalalabat a group of 180 elderly 
Muslims earthed up 10 hectares of cotton ields in an organized fashion.54 Akhtiamov 
commented that he encountered the organization of agricultural work by imams most 
often in the Farghona Valley, where Muslims regarded the gathering of cotton as a 
“helpful” deed.55 When the imams did not organize such participation in agricultural 
work, they sought to facilitate the harvest in other ways. in one instance in 1946, a 
prominent islamic scholar arranged the delivery of food to kolkhozniki working in 
the ields around Osh, including 700 kilograms of grain and a large quantity of dairy 
products. Right around the same time, an unregistered mulla in rural osh district, 
Zaynuddin Sulaymanov, delivered a lecture at the general meetings of a number of 
sel’sovets in the Madyn kolkhoz, entitled “the Restoration and Development of the 
USSR’s National Economy”. Sulaymanov spoke at the request of representatives 
of the Party’s district committee.56
Oficialdom could not help but hold Muslims in some esteem for their 
demonstrations of loyalty and enthusiasm for the postwar tasks facing people 
and state. The quarterly and annual reports iled by CARC’s representatives in 
1945 and 1946 all contain separate sections detailing the “patriotic activities of 
the believers” (patrioticheskaia deitael´nost´ veruiushchikh), an indication that 
the addressees of this correspondence in Moscow did not deem this phenomenon 
unworthy of attention. At the local level, some Soviet oficials saw nothing unusual 
49. kRBMA 2597/1s/1/53 (1946).
50. kRBMA 2597/1s/1/ 70 (june 1, 1946).
51. kRBMA 2597/1s/4/421 (December 25, 1947). like SADuM, Gosobespechenie could sell 
any incoming non-cash donations at the market value (po rynochnoi tsene). 
52. kRBMA 2597/1s/1/131 (September 30, 1946).
53. 1s / 4 / 421 (December 25, 1947).
54. kRBMA 2597/1s/1/70 (june 1, 1946). 
55. kRBMA 2597/1s/1/170 (March 11, 1947).
56. kRBMA 2597/1s/1/142 (november 14, 1946).
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in Muslims’ full contribution to the reconstruction of the economy after the war. 
in some instances, they clearly expected such contributions on the part of Muslims. 
Gosobespechenie’s ofice in Chüy district, Frunze province approached the mosque 
in tokmuk with a list of 20 frontovniki and their families, asking them to distribute 
charitable contributions directly to the latter. in this instance the charity amounted 
to 30 puds or almost 500 kg of corn.57 in yet another occurrence, a representative 
of Özgön’s city hall (gorispolkom) came to the registered mosque during prayers. 
He requested the assistance of those present in digging a canal for the construction 
of a power station. in an organized fashion the Muslims got to work (ne plokho 
porabotali). Akhtiamov’s only objection was that the gorispolkom had not made 
the request through CARC.58 Elsewhere, the deputy head of Frunze city call wrote 
that city’s mosque an oficial letter, asking it to help Gosobespechenie assist the 
families of fallen soldiers. this bureaucrat, himself ethnically Russian, even went 
on to inform the Muslims that the organization’s district branches did not have 
suficient funds to cope with demand.59 these examples suggest that many local 
oficials viewed imams and Muslims as partners in the rebuilding of the country. 
In fact, a signiicant segment of oficialdom itself practiced religion in one way 
or another. State and Party records list thousands of incidents wherein Communists 
observed customs identiied by the population as Islamic, such as circumcision, the 
payment of bride price, and the organization of feasts, often on a colossal scale, to 
celebrate major life cycle events. Muslim Communists appear to have observed 
the circumcision of their sons and related festivities (sunnat to’y) with particular 
dedication. For the most part the records identify low-level oficials, namely the 
secretaries of kolkhoz and MtS party organizations, as believers. nevertheless, 
not infrequently they mention high-level state and party employees at the district 
level. For example, in Ala Buka (Ola Bo’qa) district, Jalalabat province, the head of 
one kolkhoz sought and received the permission of both the Party and government 
district committee chairmen to organize festivities on the circumcision of his son. 
lasting from December 20-22, 1947, the feast saw the attendance
of all the kolkhoz and sel´sovet heads, the secretaries of the Party organizations 
and many district workers, 500 people in total, who were lodged in 25 homes […] 
Schools and village organizations did not work for three days. our information 
suggests such instances are hardly isolated in Ala Buka.60 
Elsewhere, the heads of the internal Affairs Ministry branches in jetti oguz 
district, Ysyk köl province and the city of osh both circumcised their sons.61 
57. kRBMA 2597/1s/1/84 (july 6, 1946).
58. kRBMA 2597/1s/4/216 (March-April 1947).
59. kRBMA 2597/1s/1/5 (july 10, 1945).
60. kRBMA 2597/1s/4/407 (january 2, 1948).
61. kRSDBMA 56/4/665/157 (july 26, 1948). 
 iSlAMiCAllY inFoRMED SoViEt PAtRiotiSM in PoStWAR kYRGYZStAn   403 
in Bozor qo’rg’on district, osh province – regarded as among the two or three 
most “religious” regions in the republic – the head of the Propaganda and Agitation 
Department at the Party’s district committee organized a feast to celebrate his son’s 
circumcision, inviting all the highly-placed authorities in the area as well as many 
kolkhoz heads.62 It was apparently very common for oficials organizing sunnat 
to’ys to invite their highly placed colleagues – so much so that a declaration of 
the kyrgyz Communist Party singled this phenomenon out for special criticism.63 
District oficials may have seen the festivities as valuable networking opportunities, 
both for career advancement and local prestige. Relecting the wide currency of 
these examples, Akhtiamov admitted that a signiicant number of Communists 
circumcised their sons.64 it bears mentioning that such references appear as 
frequently with respect to the north as to the southern parts of Kyrgyzstan.
Continuing this line of analysis, it seems plausible to suggest that the Muslim 
population did not regard membership in the Communist party and identiication 
with the Muslim faith as morally problematic. in this connection the list of Muslim 
Communists extends far beyond incidents related to circumcision. For example, 
the second secretary of the Party’s district committee in kochkor, naryn province, 
invited imams to read the funeral prayer for his mother-in-law. A signiicantly 
more important igure, the head of the Internal Affairs Ministry in Talas province, 
buried his mother in the same fashion.65 the chair of the Propaganda and Agitation 
Department at the Party’s jangy jol district committee (jalalabat province) 
took a second wife, sealed by an islamic contract in the presence of an imam.66 
in Przheval´sk, at the eastern tip of Ysyk köl, a Communist and former head 
of the city’s housing department – a crucial post in any Soviet city – attended 
congregational prayers on ‘Eid ul-Adha with his 14 year old son, Marlen.67 
nor did surrounding Muslims not belonging to the Party necessarily regard their 
fellow Muslim Communists as anything otherwise. When a Party member died in 
jetti oguz district, Ysyk köl province, her family insisted on a burial with islamic 
rites. CARC’s deputy in the province asked the oficiating unregistered imam why 
he assented to performing the funeral prayer over an atheist. the latter replied 
that the women in question believed in God, and that her membership in the Party 
amounted to a purely formal affair.68
none of this means that kyrgyzstan’s Communist Party lacked in ethnically 
kyrgyz and uzbek members who did not believe in God and severed all ties, 
62. kRBMA 2597/1s/11/28 (March 28, 1949) As head of the Propaganda and Agitation 
Department, he held primary responsibility in the district for organizing anti-religious 
propaganda. 
63. kRSDBMA 56/4/589/170-171 (August 30, 1946).
64. kRBMA 2597/1s/4/394 (january 22, 1948).
65. kRBMA 2597/1s/7/88 (july 15, 1948).
66. kRBMA 2597/1s/7/125 (june 27, 1948).
67. kRBMA 2597/1s/ 8/50 (September 2, 1948). Marlen: an abbreviation of “Marx-lenin.” 
68. kRBMA 2597/1s/ 4/307 (october 21, 1947).
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cultural and philosophical, with islam. But these examples do suggest that those 
wishing to cherish the goal of building Communism, the values of islam (including 
one’s ties with the all-important ancestors), and patriotism for the Soviet union had 
a viable way of doing all and one at the same time. it is clear that Muslims from a 
diverse array of settings found a way to harmonize these different afiliations: from 
the hujras of the muftiate in tashkent, to the mines of southern kyrgyzstan, to osh 
and a large number of Communist Party organizations. 
Conclusion
By questioning how different Muslims negotiated belonging to Islamic and Soviet 
communities, this paper has attempted to shed light on the war’s socio-religious 
signiicance for Central Asia and its population. Central Asian Muslims appraised 
World War ii, and its legacy for state and society, in terms both Soviet and 
islamic. this argument adds a new dimension to our understanding of the war’s 
profound impact upon this region. Aside from other documented consequences of 
the cataclysm – the dispatch of Central Asian men to the Soviet-nazi front, the 
evacuation of specialists and intellectuals as well as the arrival of migrants from 
the Western uSSR into tashkent and other cities, and the relocation of industry 
from front line regions – Central Asia experienced profound transformation in the 
religious sphere as well. Relaxed or non-existent controls on religion engendered a 
new ield of possibilities that took direct inspiration from the war.
this outcome indicates the need to pursue an “on-the-ground” approach towards 
understanding how the uSSR’s citizens made sense of being Soviet, even as it 
suggests that scholars should reexamine the role of religion in framing popular 
understandings of the war. Ordinary people digested their afiliation with the USSR 
and Communism in ways the state clearly did not intend. notably, Central Asian 
Muslims attached symbolic value to the reforms of 1943-1944, even though the 
Stalinist Party-state framed them solely in terms of closely supervised and curtailed 
religious institutions. throughout the country, popular understandings of being 
Soviet clearly differed from those articulated in oficial sources.69 like other Soviet 
citizens, many (though not all) developed ways of inding peace with the society 
they lived in, despite memories of the transformative violence of earlier decades.
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69. of course, popular understandings of what it meant to be Muslim also differed from those 
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